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THE SUPREME COURT'S COERCION TEST:
INSUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
Matthew A. Peterson
INTRODUCTION
The organizing principle of coercion has assumed increasing impor-
tance in First Amendment establishment of religion jurisprudence. The
first clause in the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."' The Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman
introduced coercion as a First Amendment standard. 2 The Lee Court
stated that "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or partici-
pate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'estab-
lishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' "3 Recently,
the Court has expanded the coercion test to cover activities that employ
indirect coercion, or coercion imposed by majorities with the tacit sanc-
tion of government entities.4
This Note argues that the coercion test as currently formulated by
the Supreme Court is an insufficient bulwark against constitutional viola-
tions under the religious Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The coercion standard, and by implication, the endorsement standard, do
not maintain the framework that the Founders, specifically James
Madison, promulgated in order to protect religious and political liberty.
Part I of the Note will chronicle the development of the coercion princi-
ple as an alternative or addition to the Court's other tests for the estab-
lishment of religion. The note will then outline the Madisonian model of
religious liberty.
Part II will examine three ways that the coercion test fails to account
for the various possibilities of establishment violations. First, the coer-
cion standard fails to detail a coherent approach to those " borderline"
establishment cases that involve what some have termed either "civil re-
ligion" or "ceremonial deism." Second, the concept of coercion cannot
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
2 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
3 Id. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)). Compare School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (holding that coercion
is not necessary for an establishment clause violation).
4 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
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adequately address what has become the most contentious of religious
establishment disputes: how to balance the right to religious speech with
the strictures against governmental establishment of religion.5 This part
of the essay will focus on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Good
News Club v. Milford Central School.6 Third, the coercion standard is
inherently limited by its conceptual boundaries; it is a test that narrowly
focuses on coercion within institutional settings and the ability of dis-
senters to respond to that institutional coercion. Cases that follow Lee
will demonstrate the severe limitations of its approach. Finally, Part III
argues that the Supreme Court is drifting toward the coercion test as
something more than a threshold standard for government actions con-
cerning religious establishment. Any wholesale adoption of the coercion
standard as both a constitutional floor and ceiling would insufficiently
protect religious liberty in the United States.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE COERCION STANDARD
A. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
The Supreme Court's most widely applied test for impermissible
establishments of religion is the three-prong test laid out in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.7 In that case, the Court held that a statute must have a secular
legislative purpose, its principal effect must not advance or inhibit relig-
ion, and the statute must not foster "'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.' "8 Violation of any prong demands that the law be
struck down.9 The Court struck down a Rhode Island statute which pro-
vided a supplement for teachers' salaries at non-public schools and a
Pennsylvania statute that provided for salary and cost reimbursements for
the teaching of secular subjects at non-public schools.' 0 The Court found
that both statutes fostered "an impermissible degree of entanglement"
between religion and the government."l The Court observed that the
"surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideo-
logical role gives rise to entanglements between church and state."' 2
Some perceive the Lemon test as uncertain and insufficiently subtle
to resolve the often complicated issues of free exercise and establishment
5 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
995 (1997).
6 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not "Free
Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379 (2000).
8 Id. at 613, (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
9 Id. at 612.
10 Id. at 606.
1' Id. at 615.
12 Id. at 621-22.
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cases.1 3 Justice Scalia noted in 1993 that five sitting justices had previ-
ously criticized Lemon and a sixth had joined an opinion doing so. 14
Nonetheless, "the views of five Justices that [a] case should be reconsid-
ered or overruled cannot be said to have effected a change in Establish-
ment Clause law." 15
Justice O'Connor has consistently counseled for a refinement of
Lemon. O'Connor's endorsement test focuses on the purpose and effects
of government action "in order to make them more useful in achieving
the underlying purpose of the First Amendment."' 6 The endorsement
test requires that "[e]very government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement
or disapproval of religion."' 17 Endorsement is to be measured by the per-
ceptions of a reasonable observer who is "aware of the history and con-
tent of the community and forum in which the religious display [or
activity] appears."18
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test can fairly be characterized as a
species of the coercion test.19 Justices Stevens and O'Connor disagree
over the reasonable observer standard however. They differ as to
whether the standard should be the "aware" observer who feels a degree
of religious coercion or whether, in Justice Stevens' formulation, "some
reasonable observers would attribute a religious message to the State."'20
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, argues that the "endorsement in-
quiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving iso-
lated non-adherents from the discomfort of viewing symbols of a faith to
which they do not subscribe[,]" lest such a standard sweep away "'all
13 Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that Lemon "has no basis in the history of the
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results..." Wal-
lace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is probably
the most ardent opponent of Lemon. "When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we
invoke it, when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely." Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist. 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993).
14 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398. Professor Steven Gey argues that the "true target of
the antagonism many critics direct toward the three-part Lemon test is the separation [of
church and state] principle at the core of Lemon." Religious Coercion and the Establishment
Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 470 (1994).
15 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 217 (1997).
16 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (1985). See also Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
17 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
18 Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
19 The endorsement test focuses on the recipients of the message at issue and their per-
ceptions while the coercion test focuses on the circumstances of the hearer/observer. Both,
however, ultimately rely on contextual surroundings to determine the constitutionality of a
message.
20 Pinette at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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government recognition and acknowledgement of the role of religion in
the lives of our citizens.' "21
Michael Perry has grouped the endorsement and coercion tests into
what he calls the moderate version of the nonestablishment norm in con-
stitutional jurisprudence. 22 The moderate version allows that "govern-
ment may affirm a certain few very basic religious beliefs, but
government may do so only noncoercively ... The excepted beliefs are
these: there is a God, who created us and who both loves us and judges
us . . . and because [of this] . . .we are all sacred."'23 As Justice
O'Connor has noted, the "moderate" version seeks to maintain some
government recognition of religion while forbidding any element of co-
ercion in that recognition.
Although the Court in Lee did not explicitly reject the Lemon test,
the majority seemed to suggest that a coercion analysis should proceed
before any application of Lemon. The Court explained that it did "not
... reconsider Lemon v. Kurtzman... The government involvement with
religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-
sponsored and state-directed religious exercise."'24 The government ac-
tivity at issue in Lee was a nonsectarian prayer given by a rabbi at a
public junior high school graduation.2 5 The Providence, Rhode Island,
school system permitted, as a policy, a school's principal to invite a
clergy member to give benedictions and invocations at graduation cere-
monies. 26 School officials provided a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for
Civic Occasions." 27 Prepared by the National Conference of Christians
and Jews, the pamphlet counseled a nonsectarian prayer emphasizing
21 Id. at 779 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Note that Jus-
tice O'Connor's concern for allowing simply any reasonable person to serve as the measure of
the state's endorsement of religion is that these uninformed people (including any "isolated
non-adherents") would apparently not understand the difference between historically recog-
nized state involvement with religion and constitutionally impermissible endorsement. Id. at
780. The plurality opinion in Pinette would have limited the endorsement test to "expression
by the government itself, or else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of private
religious expression or activity." Id. at 764 (citation omitted). Five justices, however, held
that "impermissible message[s] of endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of
which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism." Id. at 774 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
22 Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Sikcle Sketches, 75
IND. L. J. 295, 308-32 (2000).
23 Id. at 310.
24 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
25 Id. at 581. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Constitutionality of Regu-
lation or Policy Governing Prayer, Meditation, or "Moment of Silence" in Public Schools,
110 A.L.R. Fed. 211 (2001) (summarizing the jurisprudence of this topic).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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"inclusiveness and sensitivity."28 The invocation and benediction gener-
ally celebrated the accomplishments of the students, mentioning "God"
twice and "Lord" once. 29
The Court emphasized two facts in finding an Establishment Clause
violation. 30 First, the principal, through the Guidelines and unsolicited
advice that the prayer be nonsectarian, "directed and controlled the con-
tent of the prayers. '31 Second, the Court pointed out that for those who
objected to the prayers, "attendance and participation in the state-spon-
sored religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory." 32 In ac-
counting for the coercion itself, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, emphasized the locale-a public school-and the age of the
students. Kennedy observed that this "concern may not be limited to the
context of schools, but it is most pronounced there."'33 The Court fo-
cused on the students' dilemma of either participating in a graduation
ceremony with a prayer or protesting the prayer by staying at home or
leaving the auditorium. The Lee Court made much of the children's age,
noting that "[w]e do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the
affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the State may not, con-
sistent with the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary
school children in this position. '34 Therefore, the Court restricted the
ruling to the institutional factors that defined the controversy-the set-
ting of the school, its control of the message, and the age and vulnerabil-
ity of the children. Commentators have noted that the Court "never
indicated that both factors were required to strike down the policy or that
the second factor alone [coercion] would not suffice to support a finding
of unconstitutionality. '35
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe presents a different set
of facts and a different analysis. The Santa Fe high school provided for
student elections to determine, first, whether there should be an "invoca-
tion" before high school football games, and, second, which student
should deliver that invocation during the course of one football season. 36
The Court invoked the Lemon test out of necessity when the school dis-
trict stated that there had yet to be any prayers (and, therefore, no coer-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 581-82.
30 See e.g., Tanford v. Brand, 932 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (demonstrating
the two-step formulation that most courts use when applying the Lee test), aff'd, 104 F.3d 982
(7th Cir. 1997).
31 Lee at 588.
32 Id. at 586.
33 Id. at 592.
34 Id. at 593.
35 Colin Delaney, Note, The Graduation Prayer Cases: Coercion by Any Other Name,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1783, 1804 (1999).
36 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290, 297.
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cion) under the most recent policy. The Court emphasized that the
policy lacked a secular legislative purpose, violating the first prong of
Lemon.37 Nonetheless, even this invocation of Lemon was couched in
the language of potential coercion, finding improper school action in
"empower[ing] the student body majority with the authority to subject
students of minority views to constitutionally improper messages. '"38
The majority also held that, to an objective observer, the purpose of the
invocation was to promote the school's interest in fostering prayer.39
The Court addressed the same three coercion issues that were of
concern in Lee-the institutional setting of the school, the school's con-
trol of the activity, and the age of the students. Nonetheless, there were
subtle differences that the school district sought to use in distinguishing
Lee. The school district distinguished the cases on the grounds that
while a graduation is mandated by its importance, a football game is a
voluntary social event. 40 But the majority emphasized the social desira-
bility of attending and participating in extracurricular events and held
that "'the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her
rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-spon-
sored religious practice."' 41 Although a football game takes place
outside the hours and hallways of the school, it is still a part of the school
and its officially sanctioned activities.42
Alternatively, the school district argued that the election by students
was a "circuit-breaker" in the school's involvement in the invocation,
thus precluding any finding of coercion. 43 Emphasizing prior attempts by
the school to sanction student-led prayer, the majority argued that the
election "reflects a device the District put in place that determines
whether religious messages will be delivered at home football games. '44
The Santa Fe Court "refuse[d] to turn a blind eye to the context in which
this policy arose, and that context quells any doubt that this policy was
implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer."45 Nor did
37 Id. at 313-16.
38 Id. at 316. Professor Gey argues that the majority relied on Lemon to strike down the
policy. Gey, supra note 7, at n. 13. The majority opinion, however, seems to rely most heavily
on Lee as well as the endorsement test.
39 Id. at 308.
40 Id. at 310.
41 Id. at 312 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
42 At oral argument, the counsel for the respondent students noted that high school foot-
ball in Texas was tantamount to being an obligatory social activity. Respondent's Oral argu-
ment, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (No. 99-62).
43 Id. at 305.
44 Id. at 311.
45 Id. at 315. The Court held that any assessment of the context of government activity
must employ the "objective observer" test that Justice O'Connor formulated in her "endorse-
ment" gloss on Lemon. "[Olne of the relevant questions is 'whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive
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the school intend to create an open forum when it limited student speech
to an "invocation" "solemnizing" the event. 46
Finally, the majority relied on the age of the students: "To assert
that high school students do not feel immense social pressure, or have a
truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular event that is
American high school football is formalistic in the extreme."' 47 Just as in
Lee, the "voluntary" nature of the event does not cleanse it of any coer-
cive purpose. The students are still susceptible to pressures, which while
not formally exerted by the school, would require them to either attend
and conform or stay away and protest.
While the school election in Santa Fe does provide a new twist to
the coercion issues addressed by Lee, it essentially contemplates the
same three issues: the institutional setting of the activity, the institution's
control over that activity, and the impressionability/vulnerability of those
within the institution. Santa Fe merely states that the coercion test in Lee
cannot be circumvented by a majoritarian process. The Santa Fe Court
observed that "the majoritarian process implemented by the District
guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and
that their views will be effectively silenced."'48 The Santa Fe ruling ex-
tends the boundaries of Lee to include older students, events that are
arguably more peripheral to school matters, and procedures that carry out
school wishes via appeal to majoritarian student sentiment. Like many
lower court decisions, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe applied all three
prongs of the Lemon test-purpose, effect, and entanglement, the en-
dorsement test, and the Lee coercion test.49
B. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
The Founders envisioned the Establishment Clause as a bulwark
against majoritarian oppression and coercion. Thus any present Estab-
lishment Clause standard should be assessed according to the Founders'
understanding of the principles embedded in the First Amendment. 50 In
it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."' Id. at 307, (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 73 (1985)) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). For Justice O'Connor, the "history and
ubiquity" of a practice can sanitize its religious nature. "It is... the longstanding existence of
practices ... as well as their nonsectarian nature, that leads me to the conclusion that those
particular practices.. . do not convey a message of endorsement." County of Allegheny, 492
U.S. 573, 630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
46 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 303-06.
47 Id. at 311 (quotation marks omitted).
48 Id. at 304.
49 See generally ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d
1471 (3d Cir. 1996); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.d 274 (5th Cir. 1994); Harris
v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
50 The best source for determining the Founders' intent is to be found in The Federalist.
James Madison, along with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, under the name "Publius,"
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Federalist No. 10, Madison cautions against the rule of majorities who
can "sacrifice to its ruling passions and interest both the public good and
the rights of other citizens. t51 To protect the public good and individual
and minority rights against such "majority factions" is "the great object
to which our inquiries are directed. '52 Madison warns that "[a] zeal for
different opinions concerning religion [among other matters] . . . [has]
divided mankind into parties... and rendered them much more disposed
to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common
good."'53 For Madison, this dilemma is resolved by the creation of a
federal republic, with separate branches of government. 54 According to
Madison, the size of the republic is essential, for the influence of any
particular interest that would invade minority rights is attenuated by a
more populous unit. The larger the republic the "less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more diffi-
cult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison
with one another. ' 55 Therefore, the Madisonian framework requires that
different levels and branches of government act as a check on the ex-
cesses of majority factions that impinge on minority rights.
In 1785, Madison wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance in re-
sponse to Patrick Henry's proposal to the Virginia legislature that, al-
though no denomination could qualify as the official church of the state,
an assessment should be established for the support of the "Christian
Religion" in general.5 6 Madison foresaw, in such an establishment of
religion, harms to the individual, the state, the public good, and religion
itself.57 Madison argued "[r]eligion then of every man must be left to the
conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man
to exercise it as these may dictate."'58 Madison saw Henry's bill as a
betrayal of the ideal of the United States as a religious asylum,
"degrad[ing] from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in
jointly authored The Federalist in order to convince the thirteen original states to ratify the
recently formulated Constitution. Two of the most famous essays in the collection, numbers
10 and 51, were written by Madison. JAMES MADISON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
(George W. Carey & Willmoore Kendall eds., Arlington House, 1966) (1788).
51 Id. at 80.
52 Id. A faction is a "majority or minority ... who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Id. at 78.
53 Id. at 79.
54 See generally, id. at 77-84, 320-25.
55 Id. at 83.
56 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RE-
LIGION IN AMERICA To THE CIvIL WAR 262-67 (Gaustad, E. ed., 1982).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 262.
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religion do not bend to those of the religious authority." 59 Madison also
believed state support would harm the religion itself, in that non-Chris-
tians would realize "that [Christianity's] friends are too conscious of its
fallacies to trust it to its own merits."'60
We can extract four principles from Madison's writings: 1) the pur-
pose of republican government is to restrain the effects of majority rule
on minority rights and the public good; 2) religious belief is one of those
"inflaming passions" that can lead to majority oppressions; 3) the threat
of majoritarian imposition is particularly acute in the smaller, more ho-
mogenous, units of the republic; and 4) government intervention in relig-
ious affairs violates the equal protection due to each group and
individual. The adequacy of any Establishment Clause standard must be
appraised according to Madison's principles and their corollaries.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE COERCION PRINCIPLE
A. COERCION APPLIED TO THE "CIVIL RELIGION" CASES
"Civil religion" cases demonstrate the limitations of coercion analy-
sis. These cases reveal that both the coercion test and the endorsement
test require an ambiguous de minimis religious content in order to even
trigger application of the respective tests. The term "civil religion" was
coined by sociologist Robert Bellah and refers to practices that ceremoni-
ally invoke American religious origins and national loyalties in a largely
nonsectarian, but clearly Judeo-Christian, tradition.6' Another name for
these practices is "ceremonial deism." Examples such as "the designa-
tion of 'In God We Trust' as our national motto, or the references to God
contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be understood
... as form[s of] 'ceremonial deism protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote religious repetition
any significant religious content."'62 The best-known Supreme Court
case on "ceremonial deism" is Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Court
found that prayers at the beginning of a legislative session do not violate
the Establishment Clause.63
59 Id. at 265.
60 Id. at 264.
61 ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL
WORLD (1970).
62 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
63 Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The Court noted that in "the very court-
rooms in which the United States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard and de-
cided this case, the proceedings opened with an announcement that concluded, 'God Save the
United States and this Honorable Court.' The same invocation occurs at all sessions of this
Court." Id. at 786. Compare Perry, supra note 22, at 317 n.71 (arguing that the practice in
Marsh was unconstitutional because public funds were used for religious purposes).
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The boundaries of "ceremonial deism" can be difficult to discern
and limit. One scholar has observed that "[t]he implications of ceremo-
nial deism are far-reaching because courts frequently employ this amor-
phous concept as a springboard from which to hold that other challenged
practices do not violate the Establishment Clause."64 In both Lee and
Santa Fe, the dissenting justices claimed that the prayers at issue served
a solemnizing purpose rather than embodying any kind of substantive
religious content.65 The idiom of ceremonial deism is often history or
tradition, which validates a constitutionally questionable practice through
long and repeated usage. In his dissent in Lee, Justice Scalia noted that
"[t]he history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremo-
nies featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition. '66
In Marsh, the Court upheld the subsidized prayers in the Nebraska
legislature because of its historical pedigree: "It can hardly be thought
that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint
and to pay a chaplain ... and also voted to approve the draft of the First
Amendment[,] . . . they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable. '67 It is not
likely that such unambiguous historical evidence would be frequently
available to dispose of difficult cases, however.68
The coercion standard basically employs two factors on a sliding
scale: the content of the message conveyed, and the coercion employed
in communicating that message (or, alternatively, the extent or degree of
endorsement). In other words, a legislative prayer, like that in Marsh,
would be impermissible if it contained sectarian, divisive, or preferential
64 Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 2083, 2086 (1996). Epstein argues that each finding of de minimis religious content
erodes the Establishment Clause, providing an expanded array of analogies for each subse-
quent case containing colorable similarities. Id. at 2086-89.
65 The dissents in both cases take the schools' stated intent at face value. "The Court
grants no deference to- and appears openly hostile toward-the policy's stated purposes, and
wastes no time in concluding that they are a sham." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at
322 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
66 Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The original intent of the founding gener-
ation for the Establishment Clause, if determinable at all, is highly contested. See generally
JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1990) for
the "myth" of the Christian nation. "In this view the motives of exploration and emigration,
colonial laws, revolutionary and army camp sermons, and calls for fast and thanksgiving days
all demonstrated the nation's historic Christian practice. Laws passed to secure Christian alle-
giance in the populace now were taken to reflect it." Id. at 285.
67 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
68 Note that the phrase "under God" was not added to the Pledge of Allegiance until
1954. See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954) (codified at 36
U.S.C. § 172 (1994)).
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sentiments that expressed more than Judeo-Christian "civil religion." 69
On the other hand, the nonsectarian, non-proselytizing nature of a prayer
does not constitutionally save the practice if the Court determines that
there has been endorsement and/or coercion. 70 This suggests that the
two-step analysis provided in Lee must first meet a de minimis threshold
of impermissible religious content.71 If there is not a sufficiently relig-
ious component to the message, then the coercion/endorsement test does
not apply; the difficulty is in defining de minimis or preferential.
The coercion and endorsement tests are unhelpful in creating a prin-
cipled de minimis standard. A recent case from the Seventh Circuit high-
lights the inability of those two tests to resolve the borderline cases that
raise issues of de minimis nonpreferentialism. In Books v. City of Elk-
hart, the court ruled that a monument on the grounds of the municipal
building, inscribed with an amalgamation of Jewish, Protestant, and
Catholic versions of the Ten Commandments, was unconstitutional as an
establishment of religion.72 Ignoring Lemon's third prong of "excessive
entanglement," the court effectively applied the "endorsement" purpose
and effects test.73 Applying the "purpose" prong, the court made a re-
finement not required by Supreme Court rulings. According to the Sev-
enth Circuit, "[g]iven the obvious religious nature of the text itself, it
falls to the City of Elkhart to demonstrate that it has taken steps to 'obvi-
ate its religious purpose."' 74 Since the tablet also failed the effects prong
of the endorsement test, it would not have been sufficient for the city to
affix a disclaimer to the monument, since the limited number of monu-
ments on the grounds would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that
69 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95 ('The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges
where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to prosely-
tize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.").
70 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. "The suggestion that government may establish an official
or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific
creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted." Of course, that contradiction is
exactly what the Court approved in the Marsh decision. In fact, the chaplain in Marsh had
removed references to Christ in his prayers only after a Jewish lawmaker complained in 1980.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14.
Justice Souter's concurrence in Lee emphasized that nonsectarian, nonpreferential
messages sponsored by the government were impermissible because the intentions of the
Founders precluded it and because judges should not be asked to make fine theological distinc-
tions between sectarian pronouncements and supposedly harmless nonpreferentialism. Lee,
505 U.S., 609-3 1. For Justice Souter, Marsh was distinguishable because it did not direct "any
religious message at the citizens ... [the legislators] lead." Id. at 630 n.8. But if the imprima-
tur of the state is at issue, as Justice Souter suggests, then the intended audience of the message
surely cannot be dispositive. Even so, constituents would surely hear such a message, no
matter to whom it was "directed."
71 See supra text accompanying footnotes 23-25.
72 Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000).
73 While acknowledging that Lemon "remains the prevailing analytical tool," the court
basically applied the "endorsement" gloss of Lemon. Id. at 301.
74 Id. at 304 n.8.
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"these Commandments are displayed on land designated by the govern-
ment as 'hallowed ground."' 75
The coercion standard loses virtually almost all of its hermeneutic
vitality when it is applied beyond the context of a closed environment.
Justice Kennedy, who is the foremost proponent of a coercion-based ap-
proach to Establishment Clause cases, has differed with the Court in "re-
ligious display" cases similar to Books. In Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice
Kennedy dissented from the majority in voting to uphold the display of a
creche in a county courthouse stairwell, framed by a sign saying "Glory
to God in the Highest."'76 Kennedy argued that "[p]assersby who disa-
gree with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore
them, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they
disagree with any other form of government speech. '77
Thus, it seems, Justice Kennedy's coercion principle dissipates
when it leaves the confines of the classroom (or any other milieu that the
government dominates). 78 By narrowing the focus of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence to the perspective of the person who is subjected to
government ratification of religion and unable to dissent without at-
tracting opprobrium, the coercion standard leaves the state free to em-
bark on a program of religious approval and disapproval, as long as
dissenters are free to turn their backs.79 While Justice Kennedy recog-
nizes a difference between free speech and Establishment Clause juris-
prudence,80 his concept of coercion remains focused on the significance
to the individual (reasonable) dissenter, not on the significance of the
message itself.8 Furthermore, the more sophisticated the dissenter, the
more he can fend for himself.8 2 Therefore, if one fails to meet the crite-
ria-vulnerable, susceptible, captive-then one has not been coerced, no
75 Id. at 306. Compare Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (forbidding a creche, while al-
lowing display of a menorah, next to a Christmas tree and a sign reading "Salute to Liberty,"
in front of a courthouse). Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding the
display of a crhche in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which was surrounded by various secular
Christmas items-Christmas tree, reindeer, Santa Claus house and sleigh).
77 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
78 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 ("[P]rayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk
of indirect coercion. The concern may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most
pronounced there.").
79 Perhaps Justice Kennedy's views arise from looking at the Establishment Clause
through the prism of free speech. If that is so, then institutional coercion begins to look like
forced "indoctrination," while religious displays remain just so much background noise from
the "public square" that the listener is free to filter out.
80 Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92.
81 Id. at 592 ("[I]n the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of
religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.").
82 Id. at 593 ("We do not address whether that choice [participation or protest] is accept-
able if the affected citizens are mature adults...").
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matter how strong the government assertion or how inconvenienced or
outnumbered the dissenter is.
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test does not adequately deal with
the concerns of the individual dissenter either. Her concurrence in Pi-
nette argued that the "endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of
particular individuals or saving isolated non-adherents from the discom-
fort of viewing symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe. 83
Analogizing this reasonable observer to the "reasonable person" in tort
law, Justice O'Connor says the inquiry is not "whether any person could
find an endorsement of religion, whether some people may be offended
by the display, or whether some reasonable person might think [the State]
endorses religion."'84 This reasonable observer embodies a "community
ideal," 85 with a knowledge of the "history and context of the community
and forum. '86
Unfortunately, the "reasonable person" standard can lead to further
condemnation of dissenters' beliefs. In Books, the dissenting opinion
noted that the plaintiffs are "not reasonably informed citizens, but are
demonstrating an outright hostility to religion .... which perhaps ex-
plains why, other than these two plaintiffs, no one complained to Elkhart
about the Ten Commandments monument during the forty years it stood
outside the Municipal Building. '87 The result, therefore, is that the com-
plainant's reasonableness, not the permissibility of the government's
message, becomes the measure of Establishment Clause adherence. In a
Fifth Circuit case upholding "voluntary" prayer at a high school gradua-
tion, the court noted that dissenters "attending graduation to experience
and participate in the community's display of support for the graduates
• . . should not be surprised to find the event affected by community
standards. ' 88 If this is the appropriate Establishment Clause standard,
then the Madisonian framework has been turned on its head. Rather than
protect the particularly vulnerable minority in a small, homogenous com-
munity, the endorsement test rules the minority's complaint invalid be-
cause it is outside the mainstream of community opinion.
83 Capitol Square Advisory Rev. Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (concurring in
judgment).
84 Id. at 780 (quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Grand
Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1544 (6th Cir. 1992)). Justice O'Connor argues that this does not
favor the views of the majority over those of dissenters, or in Laurence Tribe's phrasing,
"reasonable non-adherents." Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Books, 235 F.3d 277-78 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One
must inquire how Judge Manion knows that nobody complained in forty years.
88 Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992).
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B. BALANCING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE WITH FREE SPEECH
One of the most contentious issues in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence is the intersection of that clause of the First Amendment with
the First Amendment guarantees of free speech. The Supreme Court has
tried to balance the interests of religion and nonreligion. The balancing
approach "means that religion will generally not be constitutionally enti-
tled to benefits unavailable to nonreligion, nor will it be denied benefits
that are generally available to nonreligion. ' '89 Predictably, the balancing
approach "has pleased absolutely no one." 90
Cases involving religion's role in the public sphere vis a vis other
expressions have dominated the Court's docket over the last twenty
years. For example, a state university must fund, from student activity
monies, a student newspaper with a religious viewpoint when it funds
other student endeavors in an attempt to stimulate public debate.9 1 But
the university is not constitutionally required to refund student activity
fees devoted to groups with whom individual students do not agree.92 In
allowing registered student groups to use its facilities as a public forum,
a university cannot refuse to extend such privileges to religious groups. 93
Any public school that receives public funds may not, if it opens its facil-
ities to non-curricular student groups, deny equal access to student meet-
ings with any religious or political content.94 A school district that opens
its doors to community and civic groups during evenings and weekends
cannot exclude religious groups from such access.95 Government may
not exclude purely private religious speech from a traditional or desig-
nated public forum. 96 Religious speech that may be imputed to a school
is not allowed when the school controls access to speech, thereby creat-
ing something less than a "limited public forum. '97 Commentators have
noted that these cases could portend a sea change in Establishment
Clause litigation strategies. The issue of "whether student-delivered
prayers are allowed at public school graduation might be analyzed in
terms of whether allowing them is a violation of the Establishment
89 William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L. J. 193
(2000).
90 Id. Marshall promotes the idea of equality, not as substantively superior to other theo-
ries of the religion clauses, but because it promotes "doctrinal stability." See id. at 215.
91 Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
92 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisc. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
93 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
94 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
95 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
96 Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (This per se rule
garnered only a four-vote plurality).
97 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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Clause and also as to whether prohibiting them is an impermissible con-
tent-based discrimination against religious speech."98
Recently, the Supreme Court overturned a decision of the Second
Circuit, which split with the Eighth Circuit.99 In Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, the Second Circuit found that an elementary
school was allowed to exclude a religious group from using school prop-
erty for worship services. 100 A chapter of the Good News Club, run by a
local minister and his wife, purported to offer instruction "in moral val-
ues from a Christian perspective" for children ages six to twelve.101 Its
parent organization, a missionary organization called Child Evangelism
Fellowship, provided material and training to Club leaders.' 0 2 A typical
Club meeting included memorization of Bible verses, a lesson taken
from a specific Bible verse or story, singing songs and playing games. 10 3
Finally, a "challenge and invitation" segment, according to the materials,
separates the children into groups of the "saved" and the "unsaved", the
former being asked (in a typical lesson) "to give Him first place in your
life" while the latter are asked "Will you believe on Him, trusting Him to
save you?" 1°4
The Club petitioned to use school property for its meetings after
school. 105 The school, relying on its "Community Use Policy," which
opened the school to the general public but forbade use for religious pur-
poses, denied the request.' 0 6 The school said that the instruction was not
about "'development of character and ... morals from a religious per-
spective, but were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction it-
self."' 107 The Club then sought an injunction against the school, based
on, among other claims, free speech violations under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.1 08
The Second Circuit panel, recognizing that limits on speech are
based on the nature of the forum, found that the Milford schools had
98 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 995.
99 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
100 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000). Cf Good News Club v. City of Ladue Sch. Dist., 28
F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994).
101 202 F.3d at 504. The group takes its name from the "good news" of the gospel of
Jesus Christ. Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 505-06.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 506.
106 Id. at 506-07.
107 Id. at 507. Groups granted permission to use the facilities included the Boy Scouts,
the Girl Scouts, and 4-H. Id. at 504.
108 Id. at 507.
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created a "limited public forum."' 10 9 If restrictions on speech in a limited
public forum are reasonable and viewpoint neutral, then they pass consti-
tutional muster. I0 Relying on precedent, the court found that the exclu-
sion of de facto religious worship/Sunday school from school facilities
was reasonable, particularly given the perception of government sponsor-
ship in an elementary school."'I The requirement of viewpoint neutrality
is qualified by the doctrine that speech protection extends only to "'ex-
pressive activity of a genre similar to those that government has admitted
to the limited forum."11 2 Although the school had previously allowed
the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts to use facilities for purpose of leadership
and civics instruction, none of "these clubs' activities remotely ap-
proached the type of religious instruction and prayer provided by the
Club.""t 3 Therefore, the restriction was content-based, which is allowed,
not viewpoint-based, which is not." 14
The Good News opinion of the Supreme Court rejected the reason-
ing of the Second Circuit and required the school to open its doors to
religious organizations and activities of any kind when the school creates
a limited public forum. 115 The majority effectively dodged questions re-
garding the nature of the Club's activities by "conclud[ing] that the
Club's activities do not constitute mere religious worship, divorced from
any teaching of moral values."' 16 Justice Thomas darkly hints of perse-
cution in the school's action and the Second Circuit's decision: "It is
apparent that the unstated principle of the Court of Appeals' reasoning is
its conclusion that any time religious instruction and prayer are used to
discuss morals and character, the discussion is simply not a 'pure' dis-
cussion of those issues."'"17
While it may appear that the Court leaves open the possibility that a
school may restrict its forum and exclude full-blown worship services
109 Id. at 509. Note that the Supreme Court has held that "selective access does not trans-
form government property into a public forum." Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
1 10 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819-20, 829-30 (1995). The Court also held that speech
restrictions may be permissible if they preserve the purpose of the limited forum.
I Milford, 202 F.3d 502, 509.
112 Id. at 510 (quoting Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.
1992)).
113 Id. at 511.
114 Id. See generally Supreme Court amicus brief for twenty scholars of religion; Brief
for Appellant, Milford, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) (No. 99-2036) (arguing that religious content is
impossible to separate from religious viewpoint).
115 533 U.S. 98.
116 Id. at 2102 n.4. As Justice Souter's dissent notes, the majority misstates the Second
Circuit's decision when it says that "[d]espite Milford's insistence that the Club's activities
constitute 'religious worship,' the Court of Appeals made no such determination." Id. The
Appeals Court had stated that "it is difficult to see how the Club's activities differ materially
from . . . 'religious worship."' 202 F.3d at 510.
117 121 S. Ct. at 2102.
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from its property, the Court's insistence that any religious activity is a
"viewpoint" actually throws open the doors to religious activity when-
ever a school authorizes an airing of any "viewpoint." The Good News
Court found "[t]he only apparent difference between ... [the showing of
a film expressing opinions from a religious standpoint] and the activities
of the Good News Club is that the Club chooses to teach moral lessons
from a Christian perspective through live storytelling and prayer,
whereas Lamb's Chapel [an earlier 'equal access' case] 118 taught lessons
through films."' 19 Therefore, religious activity of any stripe is merely a
"mode" of discussion and pedagogy, which must be granted equal access
and time if the forum is even partially an open one. 120 Justice Souter, in
dissent, noted that unless the broad generality of the ruling were some-
how limited, "any public school opened for civic meetings must be
opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque."' 12
One commentator, echoing Justice Souter, believes that this ruling
must surely be the stopping point in majoritarian religious pressure. Due
to the "equal access granted to religious student clubs, angry cries that
religion has been banished from the public schools w [ill] lose their effec-
tiveness in creating pressure for reintroducing officially sponsored relig-
ious exercises."' 22 Yet there is no principled stopping point in the
majority's opinion-religious exercises must always be granted equal ac-
cess.123 The Good News Court found that "[b]ecause allowing the Club
to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, [the
school district] faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment
Clause compels it to exclude the Good News Club."' 24 In short, religion
must always be given equal access even though a limited public forum
can exclude certain other groups and topics. 25
118 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Ironi-
cally, the Milford case involves the same New York law as that at issue in Lamb's Chapel.
119 121 S. Ct. at 2101.
120 Nor would it avail a school district to attempt to limit an equal access policy by re-
stricting the purposes of the forum. Every forum topic touches on the welfare of the commu-
nity and the moral and character development of children-these are the very purposes of
education. Every discussion, therefore, triggers the equal access rule.
121 121 S. Ct. at 2117 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122 James L. Underwood, Essay: Applying the Good News Club Decision in a Manner
That Maintains the Separation of Church and State in Our Schools, 47 VILL. L. REv. 281, 283
(2002).
123 Leading Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 396, 402 (2001). "Good News makes clear that
once a school district has adopted an access policy permitting any sort of activity related to
character development, religious clubs need only frame their activities in such terms to fall
within the district's limited public forum." Id.
124 121 S. Ct. at 2104.
125 It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has not been particularly solicitous of relig-
ious expression that is unorthodox or unconventional. See, e.g., Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that laws of general applicability provide no exception
for religious practitioners absent legislative intervention, in spite of disproportionate burden on
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Furthermore, the Good News opinion lays the groundwork for future
decisions in line with its holding by misstating and marginalizing prece-
dent. Justice Thomas distinguishes the Lee decision by stating that coer-
cion existed there because "attendance at the graduation exercise was
obligatory."' 26 Under this analysis, the whole "coercion" rationale can
apply only when schools require attendance at school events. Lee, how-
ever, was not so limited in its scope. The majority in Lee determined that
although a school does not require attendance at graduation exercises in
order to receive a diploma, attendance, due to the importance of the event
and peer pressure, is in a "fair and real sense obligatory."' 127 This cate-
gory of state actions is much wider than the merely obligatory. By
sleight-of-hand, Good News adopts Scalia's dissent in Lee, which sug-
gests that voluntary events can never be obligatory and that "psychologi-
cal" coercion is a nonexistent phenomenon.' 28
Good News also skews the relevant unit of analysis for the coercion
or endorsement test. In determining who would sustain coercive pres-
sure, the Good News majority found that "the relevant community would
be the parents, not the elementary school children."' 129 In Justice
Thomas's analysis, the perceptions of the children, those most affected,
are "irrelevant," in spite of the Supreme Court's repeated assertions that
young children deserve special protections.1 30 Justice Souter disagreed,
maintaining "the proper focus of concern in assessing effects includes the
elementary school pupils who are invited to meetings.... who see peers
heading into classrooms for religious instruction as classes end, and who
are addressed by the 'challenge' and 'invitation.' ",131
Not only does the majority opinion give short shrift to the percep-
tions of the most vulnerable, it also contemptuously dismisses the views
of religious minorities, dissenters, or nonconformists. The Court refuses
to "employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heck-
ler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the
basis of what the youngest members of the audience might mis-
religious minorities); Heffron v. Int'l. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(upholding restrictions on nonmainstream religious expression under the time, place, and man-
ner test).
126 121 S. Ct. at 2104.
127 505 U.S. at 586.
128 Id. at 638-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Good News majority also misstates the hold-
ing in Santa Fe by distinguishing it as not involving a public forum. 121 S. Ct. at 2104. The
Santa Fe Court held, following Lee, that a coercion analysis requires not only state involve-
ment (the nature of the forum) but also a finding of coercion. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530
U.S. at 316.
129 121 S. Ct. at 2104.
130 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990);
Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14
(1981).
131 121 S. Ct. at 2119 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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perceive." 132 Any religious minority might be safely classed as a "heck-
ler" who is merely thwarting the majority's exercise of its religious and
political muscle.
Even if the concerns of the "hecklers" are valid, the Court imposes a
crude balancing test that truly enshrines majority will as controlling. The
Court gives great weight to "countervailing constitutional concerns re-
lated to rights of other individuals in the community. In this case, those
countervailing concerns are the free speech rights of the Club and its
members." 133 The Court's calculus suggests that if a majority of an ag-
gregated community prefers religious activities, which a minority sees as
coercive or as government-endorsed, then the majority must carry the
day. The Court declined to find "the danger that children would mis-
perceive the endorsement of religion is any greater than the danger that
they would perceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint if the Club
were excluded from the public forum." 134 In one conclusory sentence,
the Court assumes that the perceptions of dissenters are "misperceptions"
and validates the views of the majority. Rather than apply the endorse-
ment test in a meaningful way or remand the case for more factual devel-
opment, Justice Thomas "balances" dissenter "misperceptions" with
majority "perceptions" and unsurprisingly finds the former lacking in
substance.
Nor would de facto religious domination of an "open" forum ever
present an Establishment Clause violation. The Court "would not find an
Establishment Clause violation simply because only groups presenting a
religious viewpoint have opted to take advantage of the forum at a partic-
ular time."' 35  Although Justice Thomas had just cited Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Pinette to support the "heckler" theory, re-
fusing to find de facto religious domination a violation runs directly
counter to her concurrence, which represented the narrowest holding in
Pinette. O'Connor took care to emphasize that the Establishment Clause
could be violated even if the government neither intends nor actively
encourages the endorsement of religion. 136 O'Connor stated that "at
some point.., a private religious group may so dominate a public forum
that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration
of approval." 137 O'Connor argued that "[o]ur Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence should remain flexible enough to handle such situations
when they arise .. .[T]he Establishment Clause inquiry cannot be dis-
132 Id. at 2106.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2107 n.9.
136 Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
137 Id.
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tilled into a fixed per se rule."'138 Good News attempts to replace this
"flexibility" with a per se rule that is explicitly disapproved in Pinette.
The Good News ruling could upset the result in cases like Berger v.
Rensselaer Central School Corporation.139 In Berger, a parent of ele-
mentary school children sued to enjoin the distribution of Bibles, by
Gideon International, during classroom time.' 40 The court took issue
with the school's classification of the case as a free speech matter, which
it called an attempted "definitional coup,"1 4 1 on two grounds. First, chil-
dren "cannot be expected to make subtle distinctions between speakers or
instructors invited by the Corporation and those whose invitations are
self-initiated."' 142 Second, in spite of the fact that the school had allowed
talks by the Boy Scouts and 4-H, the school would not allow all content
into the forum, and Bible distribution was assumed to convey content,
not viewpoint.143
The rationale of cases like Berger is in jeopardy,144 creating a clash
between the coercion doctrine of a "captive audience" and the interests
of viewpoint neutrality. 145 There is an argument that Bible distribution is
less "coercive" than the graduation prayers in Lee: a Bible can be re-
turned to its giver in a way that a spoken prayer cannot. There is also the
138 Id. at 778.
139 Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993).
140 Id. at 1162.
141 Id. at 1165
142 Id. at 1166.
143 The school had also previously allowed the distribution of materials by the "Jesus'
Love Foundation," which was, according to the plaintiff, "religious in its treatment of citizen-
ship and lifestyle." Id. at 1163. If the plaintiff had objected to those materials, the case would
have been closer to the facts in Good News. The court may have nonetheless relied on the age
of the children and their inability to distinguish endorsement from an open forum in order to
enjoin the practice.
144 This is assuming that the distribution of Bibles could also be classified as "viewpoint"
in the same way that activities of the Good News Club convey general principles of citizenship
and conduct comparable to those espoused by the Boy Scouts and 4-H. One commentator has
suggested that the Court could have ruled that the Establishment Clause does not forbid per-
mitting such activities, nor do free speech protections demand its accommodation. The result
would be a patchwork of state laws that would either forbid, mandate, or allow such practices.
See Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court Case that Pits Free Speech Against Church-State
Separation, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Feb 21, 2001) at <http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20010221.html>. Such an approach would, from the perspective of the Madisonian frame-
work, be the worst possible outcome. States and localities in which there is the political will
and power to impose these regulations against the wishes of religious minorities would imme-
diately enact such legislation. In those communities where dissenters are sufficiently power-
ful, such legislation could be effectively lobbied against. The result would be that the persons
our system of government is designed to protect-the vulnerable, isolated, or powerless-
would be most harmed by the Supreme Court's unwilllingness to lay down a firm constitu-
tional principle.
145 The court in Berger resolved this dilemma by saying that a "designated public forum
is a place. Children, of course, are not. Nor does it follow that, having opened a child's mind
to one 'use,' the child's mind must be opened to all uses." Berger, 982 F.2d at 1167.
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issue of which coercion test the Court would apply to the case. Justice
Kennedy has stated that the government may engage in nominally relig-
ious speech as long as those "who disagree with the message conveyed
by these [religious] displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their
backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any other form
of government speech." 146
The distribution of Gideon Bibles would involve no affirmative act
by a student (she could merely sit in her seat and receive the Bible, either
choosing to accept or reject it) since it does not "in effect require[ ] par-
ticipation in a religious exercise." 147 Conceptually unable to resolve the
dilemmas of a limited public forum issue, the coercion doctrine would
perforce give way to either a Lemon-style analysis or an endorsement
analysis. Or, perhaps even worse, the coercion doctrine would apply and
would never violate the Establishment Clause as long as the speech is
expressing a private viewpoint and the forum is public.148 According to
James Madison, this would leave the dissenter vulnerable to a majority
who might "sacrifice to its ruling passions and interest both the public
good and the rights of other citizens." 149
C. COERCION AS LIMITING CONCEPT
The philosopher Alan Wertheimer has defined coercion claims as
involving a coercer, A, who coerces B to do some act, X. 150 Coercive
acts violate the voluntariness of people's actions, in which the will is
"overborne" by some internal condition or external pressure, or when B
can make a rational choice, but his volition is constrained by A. 151 Wert-
heimer theorizes that the law 152 uses a two-pronged theory of coercion,
146 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 574, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
147 Lee, 505 U.S. at 594.
148 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770. "Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum,
publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." But see Gey, supra note 7, at 444
("[P]rivate religious speech may be so dominant, so prominently placed, or so persistent that it
becomes a fixture of the public forum ... effectively forcing the dissenter out of the forum...
[and sending] the message that he or she is not welcome as a full-fledged member of the
political community.").
149 MADISON, supra note 49, at 80.
150 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 5 (1987).
151 See id. at 9-10.
152 Werthheimer analyzes contract, tort, marriage, and criminal law, among other areas, in
formulating his generalizations. Wertheimer thinks the law allows us to apply theories of
coercion. "For better or worse, our moral views about coercion are somewhat inchoate. The
law, by its very nature, attempts to make those inchoate beliefs reasonably consistent and
explicit." Id. at 13. Yet he is wary of the outcome-oriented approach of the courts. "[T]he
theory of coercion that underlies the law (if there is a theory) may derive from practical or
policy considerations that would be ignored or rejected by the best philosophical account. The
law ... is bound to yield a conservative account of coercion." Id. at 14.
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involving a choice and a proposal.1 53 An act is legally coercive only if
"(1) A's proposal creates a choice situation for B such that B has no
reasonable alternative but to do X and (2) it is wrong for A to make such
a proposal to B." 1 54
One important factor in evaluating a legally cognizable coercion
claim is the standard by which the coerced person, or person under du-
ress, is to be judged. In contract law, the Restatement First on duress
states that whether B would be coerced by A's proposal is determined by
B's susceptibility, not that of an average or idealized person. The Re-
statement observes that "[p]ersons of a weak or cowardly nature are the
very ones that need protection. The courageous can usually protect
themselves."'' 55 In contrast, the criminal law, as embodied in the Model
Penal Code, applies a variant of the reasonable person standard. "It is an
affirmative defense... [if B] was coerced... by the use of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force . . . which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist." 156
Placing the concept of coercion within the context of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is a difficult task. Yet the Court in Lee v. Weisman
attempted to make explicit a theory of coercion for the Establishment
Clause.157 Applying the two-pronged theory of coercion to Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion, the school's proposal would have to 1) create a choice
situation for Deborah Weisman 2) such that she had no choice but 3) to
do an act, and 4) it would have to be wrong for the school to make such a
proposal. Since the school chose to have a prayer and partially dictated
its content, 158 it "place[d] objectors in the dilemma of participating, with
all that implies, or protesting[,]"1 59 thereby creating a choice situation. 160
Such a "ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful
silence during the invocation and benediction,"' 161 thereby robbing the
dissenter of a voluntary choice. As a result, "a reasonable dissenter
could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or
approval of it."1i62 Such a proposal is wrong since "the State cannot re-
153 See id. at 172.
154 !d.
155 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
156 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (2000) (emphasis added).
157 Lee, 505 U.S. 577.
158 See id. at 580-81.
159 Id. at 593.
160 The Court discounted the argument that Deborah Weisman could choose not to attend
her junior high school graduation. "[T]o say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend
her high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme." Id. at 595.
161 Id. at 593.
162 Id.
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quire one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the
price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice."' 63
The Court also weighed in on the standard that should be applied in
judging the reaction of the coerced person. The dissenter should be "rea-
sonable."' 64 Perhaps more importantly, the Court limited its finding, by
both context and age of observer: "[w]e do not address whether that
choice [between participation and protest] is acceptable if the affected
citizens are mature adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with
the Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children
in this position." 165
Despite its seemingly broad sweep, Justice Kennedy's coercion doc-
trine is so constricted that it is truly not applicable outside its narrow fact
pattern; cases from the lower courts illustrate the limited reach of the
doctrine. In Tanford v. Brand, an Indiana district court held that a non-
denominational prayer at a college graduation was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 166 The plaintiffs, two law students, a law profes-
sor, and an undergraduate, 167 were, according to the court, differently
situated than Deborah Weisman. First, they represent adult dissenters,
who should not "'reasonably . . . believe that the group exercise
signifie[s] her own participation or approval' of the prayer or its religious
message, but rather her tolerance or respect for the views of others."1 68
Second, the graduation ceremony was large and impersonal, 69 so that a
"nonadherent could dissent without being noticed and without fear of
being identified as a nonconformist."' 170 The district court found the
prayer to be more like a prayer before a legislature, "'a tolerable ac-
knowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country.' "171
In a similar case, a faculty member at Tennessee State University
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against prayers at university
functions, including graduation ceremonies. 72 After complaints from
Dr. Chaudhuri, a professor of mechanical engineering, the university dis-
163 Id. at 596.
t64 Id. at 593.
165 Id.
166 Tanford, 932 F. Supp. 1139, affd, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997).
167 Id. at 1140.
168 Id. at 1144 (alteration in original).
169 Id. Over 30,000 people attended the graduation ceremony at issue. The court also
noted that the law students had the "meaningful alternative[ I" of attending the law school
commencement, which had no invocation or benediction. Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1146 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). Marsh, however,
was not decided on the innocuous nature of the prayer, but rather on the "unique history" of
chaplaincy in the United States Congress. See Marsh at 791.
172 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997).
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continued its practice of including "invocations and benedictions at cer-
tain university events."' 73 The President of the university informed
graduation planners that a "moment of silence" 174 would be appropriate
in lieu of prayers. 175 At graduation, "the speaker asked everyone to rise
and remain silent . . . [A] group of people began to recite the Lord's
Prayer aloud. Many audience members joined in ... and loud applause
followed."'176 School officials disavowed any advance knowledge of the
spontaneous response. 77
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Lee on several grounds, in finding
both the prayers and the moment of silence to be constitutional.1 78 First,
Dr. Chaudhuri was encouraged, but not required, to attend university
functions and graduation.' 79 Second, even if he was obliged to attend,
"[t]here was absolutely no risk that Dr. Chaudhuri... would be indoctri-
nated by exposure to the prayers."' 180 Finally, "the obvious difference
between plaintiffs such as Dr. Chaudhuri and children at an impressiona-
ble stage of life 'warrants a difference in constitutional results.' "181 The
court also applied the endorsement test, finding that a "reasonable ob-
server, it seems to us, would conclude that the nonsectarian prayers de-
livered at TSU events were intended to solemnize the events and
encourage reflection."1 82
These two cases reflect the institutional limits of a coercion (and
endorsement) approach to the Establishment Clause. The only ways the
Tanford and Chaudhuri ceremonies differ from that in Lee are that the
plaintiffs were not children, the venue was a bigger one, and there was a
decreased "obligation" to attend the ceremonies. But the Establishment
Clause is premised on a more comprehensive theory. As the Santa Fe
Court noted, "sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible be-
cause it sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are
173 Id. at 233.
174 The Supreme Court's only holding on a "moment of silence" is Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985), in which the Court struck down an Alabama statute since the only ex-
pressed purpose for the statute was to return voluntary prayer to the schools. Id. at 43. But see
Bown v. Gwinnett, 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997), in which the court upheld a Georgia
statute providing for a moment of quiet reflection in which students were neither encouraged
to pray nor listen to the prayers of others.
175 Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 235.
176 Id.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 237-38.
179 See id. at 239.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 237. The only prayer in the factual record was a 1991 commencement prayer
that mentioned God twice and the "Heavenly Father" five times. Id. at 234. The dissent noted
the university's recent history of including invocations that called on Jesus Christ, and stated
that "[t]he mere omission of the name Jesus Christ does not ipso facto render an otherwise
Christian prayer neutral." Id. at 241.
THE SUPREME COURT'S COERCION TEST
nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.'",,83
The plaintiffs brief in Chaudhuri stated that limiting the coercion
principle to the secondary school milieu of Lee would "turn the Estab-
lishment Clause into a children's rights measure."184 Indeed, applying
either the individualized duress standard in contracts or the Model Penal
Code's "person of reasonable firmness in his situation"1 8' standard
would demand that courts analyze each coercion claim individually. In-
stead, the courts have chosen to create categories on which the validity of
coercion claims will turn. It would not be "reasonable" for an adult dis-
senter to believe that her actions represent a coerced approval of state
actions; instead her participation merely represents "her tolerance or re-
spect for the views of others." 186 A "reasonable" adult dissenter, there-
fore, is different from a "reasonable" adolescent dissenter.
By conditioning the reasonableness of a dissenter's perceptions on
his or her age, the lower courts' coercion analysis effectively transforms
the test into Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. The endorsement test
does not inquire "about the perceptions of particular individuals or sav-
ing isolated nonadherents from the discomfort of viewing symbols of
faith to which they do not subscribe."' 187 Rather, according to Professor
Stephen Gey, "Justice O'Connor relays the message to religious minori-
ties that their perceptions are wrong; or, even worse, that their percep-
tions do not matter."' 88 More than simply suggesting "tolerance or
respect for the views of others,"' 89 the endorsement test requires such
respect in the form of a dissenter's accommodation. It is a classic boot-
strap argument: since these invocations are nothing more than the views
of others that deserve tolerance and respect, then standing during them
can signify nothing more than tolerance and respect.' 90
Rather than apply the individualized duress standards of contracts or
criminal law in the Establishment Clause cases, the endorsement test ig-
nores the individual in favor of the idealized observer. The Pinette Court
183 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 310 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
184 Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239.
185 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
186 Tanford, 932 F. Supp. at 1144.
187 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188 Gey, supra note 7, at 481.
189 Tanford, 932 F. Supp. at 1144.
190 This tautology demonstrates another of the drawbacks of the coercion approach: the
requirement of an act. "[I]f 'the act of standing or remaining silent' during a graduation prayer
is 'an expression of participation' in the prayer, why is walking by an overtly Christian display
in respectful silence not also 'an expression of participation' in the display?" Gey, supra note
7, at 503.
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stated that "the applicable observer is similar to the 'reasonable person'
in tort law, who.. is "a personification of a community ideal of reasona-
ble behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment."1 91 This
approach violates two fundamental conclusions. First, it violates the
Madisonian framework, which is dedicated to protecting the interests of
minorities and the public good from the impositions of a majority fac-
tion.192 Second, it imposes on religion, in all its diversity, a rationality
and reasonableness that is inappropriate within the context of a Constitu-
tion that guarantees the free exercise of religion.1 93
III. CONCLUSION
There is no consensus on the Supreme Court that the coercion stan-
dard should be the measure of First Amendment Establishment Clause
claims.194 Furthermore, the scope of "coercion" remains largely unde-
cided, with some justices advocating a narrow interpretation of the con-
cept, while others advocate a more contextualized, broader
conceptualization.195 Scholars have argued that the coercion standard re-
mains too imprecise and subject to case-by-case interpretation, making it
even less predictable than the maligned Lemon test.196
This Note argues, however, that not only does the coercion standard
lack any meaningful guiding definition, it also remains subject to its in-
stitutional matrix. The two leading cases applying the coercion standard,
Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe v. Doe, involve disputes in public schools.
The similar settings of those cases-the nature of the institution, the ex-
tent of its control, and the vulnerability of those subject to its control-
have an effect which skew the results and suggest that the coercion stan-
dard, when applied in different contexts, would not protect either relig-
ious liberty or restrain government action to a constitutionally sufficient
191 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780-81 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)) (alteration in original).
192 As commentators have recognized in the context of free speech, "[i]f we must have a
'central meaning' of the First Amendment, we should recognize that the dissenters ... stand at
the center of First Amendment and not at its periphery." STEVEN H. SHLFFRIN, DISSENT, INIus-
ICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 10 (1999).
193 The two fundamental ingredients of religion are: "beliefs (historical, mythological,
theological, philosophical) and actions related to those beliefs (ethical, liturgical, social, politi-
cal)." GAUSTAD, supra note 57, at 2. Therefore, to reduce religious belief to reason and ra-
tionality misconstrues and disserves the purposes of religion.
194 See Comm. for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 ("[P]roof of coercion...
[is] not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause.").
195 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I would deny that the dissenter's
interest in avoiding even the false appearance of participation constitutionally trumps the gov-
ernment's interest in fostering respect for religion generally.") (emphasis in original).
196 See Gey, supra note 7, at 492.
THE SUPREME COURT'S COERCION TEST
degree. And where attendance is not mandatory or socially desirable, the
test doesn't apply at all. 197
The plurality in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pi-
nette did not use a coercion standard, but both its opinion and the concur-
rence of the endorsement test's greatest advocate, Justice O'Connor,
suggests the triumph of the coercion paradigm.1 98 If a space is "open to
a wide variety of uses"'199 and "the government has not fostered or en-
couraged" 200 the appearance that private speech is state-sponsored, there
can be no Establishment Clause violation. This rule suggests that a dis-
senter is not protected from any private speech on any multi-use govern-
ment property, even if that property becomes a de facto church, so
dominated by one religious group that the property is perceived to be
theirs. Since the dissenter can always turn his back or walk away, he is
not being coerced to do anything.
Similarly, the "reasonable observer" test of the endorsement stan-
dard leaves the non-mainstream dissenter out in the cold. According to
O'Connor, the "state has not made religion relevant to standing in the
political community simply because a particular viewer might feel un-
comfortable."'20 The endorsement test is not about "saving isolated
nonadherents from... discomfort. '202 The Establishment Clause is not
subject to a "heckler's veto."'20 3 This "objective" test has been referred
to as the Court's "We Know It When We See It" Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. 2° 4 As long as no "reasonable" person has been made to
feel that she is less than a full-fledged citizen because of government
involvement with religion, then any harm is negligible.
James Madison argued that governmental protections of the relig-
ious and nonreligious should be especially solicitous of the minority dis-
senter, particularly where her numbers are so small that the majority pays
little heed to her community status. 20 5 The case of a junior high school
student in Texas illustrates the necessity of such protection. Prayers at
her school were conducted at graduation, at awards ceremonies, and
before and after basketball games.206 Gideon Bibles were distributed in
fifth grade and the school's choir often sang explicitly Christian songs. 20 7
When she elected not to participate in the basketball game prayers, one
197 Good News, 121 S. Ct. 2093.
198 Pinette, 515 U.S. 753.
199 Id. at 762.
200 Id. at 766.
201 Id. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
202 Id. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
203 Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2106.
204 See Gey, supra note 7, at 447.
205 See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
206 Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 161-63 (5th Cir. 1993).
207 Id.
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spectator yelled out "Isn't she a Christian?" and her history teacher sub-
sequently called her "a little atheist. '208 All statements could be consti-
tutionally permissible, if the definition of coercion or endorsement were
sufficiently narrow. The Madisonian framework of the First Amendment
was intended to protect religious minorities, dissenters, and nonconform-
ists from the impositions of the majority: current Supreme Court doctrine
augurs the abandonment of that principle.
208 Id. at 162-63.
